

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 08272 01 OF 03 150155Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 ARA-10 ACDA-12  
DOE-11 SOE-02 NRC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
/125 W

-----111660 150342Z /64

R 150129Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6700  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
SECDEF WASH DC  
DIA WASH DC  
CNO WASH DC  
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
COMIDEASTFOR  
COMSIXTHFLT  
JCS WASH DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 08272

VIENNA FOR IAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OCLR, US, EG  
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP (NPW) TRANSIT OF THE  
- SUEZ CANAL--TALK WITH DEPUTY PRIMIN AHMED SULTAN

REF: (A)CAIRO 7166, (B)CAIRO 7257, (C)CAIRO 7539,  
- (D)STATE 23171, (E)STATE 62569, (F)STATE 55974

SUMMARY: MET TODAY WITH DEPUTY PRIMIN AHMED SULTAN TO  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 08272 01 OF 03 150155Z

DISCUSS REFERENCED SUBJECT AND REQUEST HIS SUPPORT.  
USED MATERIAL I HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN GAMASY AND KAMEL  
AND ALSO GAVE SULTAN COPY OF AIDE MEMOIRE, STANDARD  
STATEMENT AND U.S. PUBLIC LAW 93-513. STRESSED UNEQUALLED  
SAFETY RECORD OF U.S. NPW'S. SULTAN SAID HE PERSONALLY  
IS FAVORABLY INCLINED, BUT NOTED MEMBERS OF SPECIAL  
COMMITTEE SET UP LATE LAST YEAR TO LOOK INTO SAFETY

ASPECTS OF NPW TRANSIT OF CANAL CONTINUE CONTEND NO SUCH TRANSITS OR VISITS SHOULD BE ALLOWED UNTIL AFTER THEIR STUDY COMPLETED. ON HIS SUGGESTION, DR. IBRAHIM HAMUDA OF EGYPTIAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT INVITED IN TO MEETING TO EXPRESS COMMITTEE'S CONCERNS. HAMUDA SPOKE OF IAEA SAFETY CRITERIA AND MENTIONED COMPLETE ABSENCE IN SUEZ CANAL AREA OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR PLANS TO HANDLE ANY NUCLEAR EMERGENCY THAT MIGHT ARISE FROM NUCLEAR SHIP TRANSIT. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, SULTAN ASKED IF WE COULD SEND U.S. EXPERT KNOWLEDGEABLE OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NPW SAFETY PROCEDURES TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH COMMITTEE MEMBERS. I UNDERTOOK LOOK INTO THIS POSSIBILITY. SULTAN ASSURED ME THAT, ON HIS PART, HE WILL DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO EXPEDITE GOE POLICY DECISION. HAVE COORDINATED MY ACTIONS WITH U.K. AMBASSADOR, WHO ALSO PROVIDED SOME INFO ON SPECIAL COMMITTEE WHICH GOE ESTABLISHED LAST YEAR TO STUDY SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

1. HAD HOUR AND A HALF MEETING THIS MORNING WITH DEPUTY PRIMIN AHMED SULTAN TO DISCUSS REFERENCE SUBJECT. HE HAD WITH HIM HIS PRINCIPAL AIDE, MAHER ABAZA. SULTAN CONFIRMED THAT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EGYPTIAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM MINSCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS (HELMY) TO HIS MINISTRY.

2. I FIRST WENT THROUGH THE POINTS CITED PARA 5 REF D,  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 08272 01 OF 03 150155Z

EMPHASIZING UNEQUALLED SAFETY RECORD OF OUR NPW'S. AT HIS REQUEST, I LEFT SAME AIDE MEMOIRE CONTAINING THESE POINTS THAT I HAD EARLIER GIVEN TO GAMASY AND KAMEL. ' ALSO GAVE HIM COPIES OF STANDARD STATEMENT AND U.S. PUBLIC LAW 93-513. NPW'S, I POINTED OUT, REGULARLY TRANSIT PANAMA CANAL ON BASIS UNILATERAL ASSURANCES. TOLD HIM I HAD EARLIER SPOKEN WITH GAMASY, FONMIN KAMEL AND MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI ABOUT MATTER AND THAT GAMASY HAS ALREADY RECOMMENDED THAT MFA CONVENE INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE TO ARRIVE AT GOE POLICY DECISION. GAMASY HAD ASSURED ME THAT MINDEFENSE REP WILL SUPPORT FREE PASSAGE OF U.S. NPW'S ON BASIS UNILATERAL ASSURANCES (STANDARD STATEMENT). I HOPED THAT, IN LIGHT EXPLANATION I HAD GIVEN HIM, SULTAN WOULD ALSO INSTRUCT HIS REPRESENTATIVE TO SUPPORT FREE PASSAGE.

3. SULTAN LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO WHAT I HAD TO SAY. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT A U.S. NPW HAD ALREADY VISITED ALEXANDRIA AND THAT ANOTHER ONE WILL DO SO SHORTLY, SULTAN EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE. HE SAID MEMBERS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE SET UP LAST YEAR FOLLOWING GOE RELUCTANCE TO ALLOW GERMAN NUCLEAR-POWERED COMMERCIAL

VESSEL "OTTO HAHN" TO TRANSIT CANAL (GERMANS THEN WITH-DREW REQUEST) HAD JUST SENT HIM A REPORT URGING THAT NO NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSELS OF ANY KIND BE ALLOWED TO VISIT ALEXANDRIA OR TRANSIT SUEZ CANAL UNTIL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ABLE STUDY SUBJECT FURTHER. COMMITTEE HAD CLAIMED NO NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSELS HAD VISITED ALEXANDRIA. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS WRONG. ACCORDING OUR INFORMATION, SOVIET NPW HAD VISITED ALEXANDRIA AS EARLY AS 1972 (REF E) AND USS CALIFORNIA HAD VISITED IN OCTOBER 1976 WITH FULL APPROVAL GOE. SULTAN SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO SUCH VISITS. MOREOVER, HE PERSONALLY WAS IN FAVOR OF A

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 08272 02 OF 03 151025Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 ARA-10 ACDA-12  
DOE-11 SOE-02 NRC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
/125 W

-----116531 151029Z /10/64

R 150129Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6701  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
SECDEF WASH DC  
DIA WASH DC  
CNO WASH DC  
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
COMIDEASTFOR  
COMSIXTHFLT  
JCS WASH DC

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 08272

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT CORRECTED)

POSITIVE GOE POLICY DECISION ON U.S. NPW'S TRANSITING  
SUEZ CANAL ON BASIS UNILATERAL ASSURANCES. NEVERTHELESS,  
HE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SPECIAL  
COMMITTEE. HE ASKED IF I WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO

DEPUTY CHIEF OF EGYPTIAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT,  
DR. IBRAHIM HAMUDA, A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, BEING  
INVITED INTO MEETING SO THAT HAMUDA COULD TELL ME  
COMMITTEE'S CONCERNS. I SAID I HAD NO OBJECTION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 08272 02 OF 03 151025Z

4. HAMUDA WAS THEN INVITED IN AND SULTAN EXPLAINED TO  
HIM NATURE OF OUR TALK UP TO THAT POINT. SULTAN INVITED  
HAMUDA TO COMMENT. SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY, HAMUDA ASKED  
WHETHER U.S. NPW'S ARE SUBJECT TO IAEA CONTROLS AND  
INDICATED GOE HAD ASKED LATTER FOR COUNSEL AFTER "OTTO  
HAHN" TRANSIT DENIAL. IAEA, HE NOTED, HAS ESTABLISHED  
SAFETY CRITERIA FOR MEASURING RADIOACTIVITY BEFORE AND  
AFTER NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIP VISITS TO PORTS. IAEA SAFETY  
MEASURES ALSO BASED ON "MOST CREDIBLE ACCIDENT" AND,  
IN MENTIONING THIS, HAMUDA NOTED COMPLETE ABSENCE OF  
ANY EQUIPMENT IN SUEZ CANAL TO MEASURE RADIOACTIVE  
WASTE OR OF ANY PLANS TO EVACUATE PEOPLE IN EVENT OF  
AN ACCIDENT.

5. I AGAIN EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE IN DESIGN AND  
OPERATION BETWEEN NUCLEAR-POWERED COMMERCIAL VESSELS  
AND U.S. NPW'S. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ANY IAEA COUNSEL,  
WHICH I THOUGHT WOULD PROBABLY NOT DIFFERENTIATE CLASSES  
OF NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS. I REITERATED UNEQUALLED  
SAFETY RECORD OF U.S. NPW'S AND UNILATERAL ASSURANCES  
WHICH WE ARE PREPARED PROVIDE, NOTING THAT THIS IS A  
MATTER OF GOE ACCEPTING OUR ASSURANCES IN GOOD FAITH.

6. SULTAN WAS VERY HELPFUL. HE PICKED UP SOME OF THE  
SAME POINTS THAT I HAD MADE AND ON HIS OWN MADE THEM TO  
HAMUDA. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, HAMUDA WAS STILL UNEASY. HE  
PROPOSED THAT GOE MIGHT ASK IAEA TO SEND AN "EXPERT"  
TO EGYPT TO DISCUSS SAFETY ASPECTS OF NPW TRANSIT OF  
SUEZ CANAL. I ARGUED AGAINST THIS, REITERATING THE  
POINT THAT IAEA DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN NUCLEAR-  
POWERED COMMERCIAL VESSELS AND NPW'S. SULTAN THEN ASKED  
IF USG MIGHT BE WILLING TO SEND AN "EXPERT" TO DISCUSS  
WITH SPECIAL COMMITTEE THE TECHNICAL SAFETY ASPECTS OF

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 08272 02 OF 03 151025Z

NPW'S TRANSITING SUEZ CANAL. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SOME  
ASPECTS OF U.S. NPW DESIGN AND OPERATIONS ARE CLASSIFIED,  
BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD STILL BE HELPFUL IN ALLAYING SOME  
COMMITTEE MEMBERS' CONCERNS IF A USN "EXPERT" KNOWLEDGEABLE

OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NPW SAFETY PROCEDURES COULD DISCUSS THEM WITH EGYPTIANS. I SAID I WOULD LOOK INTO THIS. MAHER ADDED THAT IF SUCH AN "EXPERT" COULD BE SENT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD ALSO BE BRIEFED ON HOW PANAMA CANAL MONITORS NPW AND OTHER NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSEL TRANSITS TO INSURE ALL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN.

7. HAMUDA NOTED SUEZ CANAL COMPANY WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSULTED. I SAID IT WAS, OF COURSE, ENTIRELY UP TO GOE WHOM TO CONSULT, BUT MADE A POINT OF MENTIONING THAT I HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED GENERAL GAMASY IF I SHOULD CONSULT WITH , SCA. GAMASY HAD CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT SCA NEED NOT BE CONSULTED. GOE, GAMASY HAD STATED, NOT AN OPERATING COMPANY LIKE SCA, WILL MAKE DECISION. SULTAN NODDED APPROVINGLY, BUT I SUSPECT HAMUDA WILL ARGUE FOR SCA INCLUSION.

8. HAVING IN MIND SULTAN'S EARLIER CRITICISM TO ME OF DILATORINESS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND ITS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS, I EXPRESSED HOPE TO SULTAN IN HAMUDA'S PRESENCE THAT GOE WILL TAKE EXPEDITIOUS DECISION ON THE MATTER. SULTAN ASSURED ME THAT, ON HIS PART, HE WILL DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO EXPEDITE A GOE POLICY DECISION.

9. COMMENT: HOPE U.S. NAVY CAN SEND "EXPERT" TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL DETAILS OF NPW SAFETY WITH EGYPTIANS. SUCH DISCUSSION, ACCORDING SULTAN, WOULD BE WITH DR. HAMUDA, DR. SAMIRA MURSY, HEAD OF "PROTECTION COMMITTEE" OF ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES. IF WE ARE AGREEABLE TO SENDING SUCH AN OFFICIAL, I RECOMMEND THAT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 08272 03 OF 03 150319Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 ARA-10 ACDA-12  
DOE-11 SOE-02 NRC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
/125 W

-----112756 150341Z /64

R 150129Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6702  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
SECDEF WASH DC  
DIA WASH DC  
CNO WASH DC  
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
COMIDEASTFOR  
COMSIXTHFLT  
JCS WASH DC

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 08272

WE DO SO WITHIN NEXT TEN DAYS SO THAT WE CAN KEEP MOMENTUM THAT I HAVE BEGUN ON THIS MATTER GOING. SUCH EXPERT SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON WHAT PRECAUTIONS PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITIES TAKE WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSEL TRANSITS.

10. RE PARA 6, REF E, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH U.K. AMBASSADOR MORRIS AND ALUSNA HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIS BRITISH EMBASSY COUNTERPART ON THIS MATTER. MORRIS HAS TOLD ME BRITISH HAVE NO PRESENT PLANS TO REQUEST TRANSIT OF NPW IN NEAR FUTURE. MORRIS INFORMS THAT SPECIAL COMMITTEE IS HEADED BY AMBASSADOR DAOUDI OF MFA AND INCLUDES  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 08272 03 OF 03 150319Z

REPS OF ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT, MINDEFENSE, AND SCA. JUDGING FROM BRITISH EMBOFF'S EARLIER TALKS WITH DAOUDI ON ABORTIVE DREADNOUGHT TRANSIT OF SUEZ CANAL, IT IS SCA WHICH IS OBJECTING MOST STRONGLY TO NPW TRANSIT ON GROUNDS IT IS UNPREPARED TO HANDLE ANY ACCIDENT THAT MIGHT OCCUR. DAOUDI APPARENTLY ALSO SAID THAT IF ATOMIC RADIATION MONITORING DEVICES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IT MIGHT

EASE SCA'S WORRIES. ALTHOUGH NO GOE OFFICIAL HAS MADE POINT TO US, DAOUDI TOLD BRITS ANY GOE REFUSAL TO ALLOW NPW TRANSIT WOULD BE MADE IN CONTEXT ARTICLE 3 OF CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION OF 1888, UNDER WHICH EGYPT CLAIMS IT HAS RIGHT TO PROTECT SAFETY OF CANAL. FINALLY, DAOUDI TOLD BRITS THAT FINAL DECISION ON NPW TRANSIT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY MINDEFENSE POSITION.

11. I HAVE NOT DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH DAOUDI AND I AM RELUCTANT DO SO AT THAT LEVEL. I PREFER IF AT ALL POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE HANDLE MATTER AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. EILTS

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 15 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978CAIRO08272  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780114-0541  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** CAIRO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780367/aaaacett.tel  
**Line Count:** 329  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** a25dcec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 CAIRO 7166, 78 CAIRO 7257, 78 CAIRO 7539  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3328752  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP (NPW) TRANSIT OF THE - SUEZ CANAL--TALK WITH DEPUTY PRIMIN AHMED SULTAN  
**TAGS:** OCLR, US, EG  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/a25dcec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014